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Examining the Repercussions of Crawford:




While making a course correction in Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence, the United States Supreme Court leaves much uncertainty in its wake.
Some hearsay evidence previously admissible under a "firmly rooted hearsay
exception" or because it possessed "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness" will no longer be allowed under the Court's new standard. However,
the Court's failure to define its key terms leaves practitioners in desperate
need of further clarification.
This Note is intended to assist Missouri practitioners in understanding
the Supreme Court's new Confrontation Clause standard as stated in Craw-
ford v. Washington and provide practical guidance for its application. The
Note identifies Missouri's existing hearsay exceptions that are likely to suffer
the greatest impact under Crawford5 and outlines a framework for determin-
ing whether a given statement violates the defendant's constitutional right of
6confrontation.
6
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Roberts Court had previously held that the admission
of hearsay evidence by an unavailable witness required that the evidence bear "ade-
quate 'indicia of reliability"' which were satisfied either when the evidence was ad-
missible under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or because it otherwise possessed
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id.
3. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-69.
4. One commentator notes that "[t]he precise ramifications of Crawford will
take some time to sort out, but they no doubt will be pervasive." Mark T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 55 MERCER L. REv. 1219, 1220 (2004). Professor Michael M. Martin ob-
served that "[i]t is very much a matter of how the courts are going to define testimo-
nial .... The Supreme Court gave us absolutely no clue on this, except for classic
testimony." Tom Perrotta, The Struggle to Define 'Testimony'After 'Crawford,' N.Y.
L. J., June 21, 2004, at 1.
5. See infra Part V.A.
6. See infra Part V.B.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On August 5, 1999, Kenneth Lee ("Lee") was stabbed in his apartment.
7
The police suspected that Michael Crawford ("Crawford") committed the act
and arrested Crawford shortly after the stabbing! After giving Miranda warn-
ings to both Crawford and his wife, Sylvia, the police interrogated each sepa-
rately. 9 During the interrogation, Crawford described an earlier incident in
which Lee tried to rape Sylvia. 10 Crawford was upset over this incident and
had gone with Sylvia in search of Lee." When they found him, the two men
fought and Crawford stabbed Lee in the torso. 12 While Crawford and Sylvia's
accounts of the events leading up to the fight were similar, they varied regard-
ing the details immediately surrounding the stabbing.' 3 Crawford's account
indicated that there may have been a weapon in Lee's hands just before the
stabbing. 14 In contrast, Sylvia stated that Lee's hands were empty prior to the
stabbing, though Lee may have been reaching for something immediately
afterward.15 The state charged Crawford with attempted murder and 
assault.' 6
At trial, Crawford claimed self-defense. 7 Sylvia did not testify at trial
because of the state's marital privilege' 8 which generally bars one spouse's
testimony without the other spouse's consent.' 9 However, this privilege did
not bar evidence of out-of-court statements made by a spouse if a hearsay
exception applied. 20 The prosecution offered Sylvia's tape-recorded state-
ments as evidence that Crawford did not act in self-defense. 2' Crawford ob-
jected claiming that the evidence violated his federal constitutional right to be
"'confronted with the witnesses against him. "
22






13. Id. at 39.
14. Id. at 38-39.
15. Id. at 39-40.
16. Id. at 40.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See WASH. REV. CODE. § 5.60.060(1) (1995 & Supp. 2005).
20. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (noting that because Sylvia admitted to facilitating
the assault by leading Crawford to Lee's apartment, the testimony was admitted as
"against penal interest" under WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (2003)).
21 d
22. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
[Vol. 70
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The trial court admitted the evidence anyway, relying on Ohio v. Rob-
erts.23 Under Roberts, the confrontation clause is not violated if the out of
court statement declared by an unavailable witness bears "adequate 'indicia
of reliability."' 24 A statement bears adequate indicia of reliability if it "falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, 25 or possesses "particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness." 26
The trial court looked primarily to procedural factors relating to Sylvia's
questioning and found that Sylvia's statements were sufficiently trustwor-
thy. The prosecution played the tape for the jury and emphasized during its
closing argument that it was "damning evidence" and that it "completely re-
futes [Crawford's] claim of self-defense., 28 Crawford was convicted of as-
sault.
29
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed Crawford's conviction after
noting inconsistencies in Sylvia's statement. 30 However, the Washington
Supreme Court reinstated the conviction after concluding that sufficient
"guarantees of trustworthiness" existed because Sylvia's statement and Craw-
ford's statement were sufficiently similar to one another.3'
23. Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).
24. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Crawford, 541 U.S. 40. The trial court reasoned that Sylvia's testimony was
sufficiently reliable because she was attempting to corroborate her husband's story,
not trying to shift blame; as an eyewitness, she had direct knowledge of the events inquestion; the events had recently occurred; and "she was being questioned by a 'neu-
tral' law enforcement officer." Id.
28. Id. at 40-41.
29. Id. at 41.
30. Id. The appellate court reasoned that Sylvia's testimony was not sufficiently
reliable because she gave multiple conflicting statements; the statement in question
was made in response to specific questions; and she admitted that she had her eyes
closed during the stabbing. Id.
31. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 664 (Wash. 2002) (en banc), rev'd, 541 U.S.36 (2004). The Washington Supreme Court indicated that "'[wihen a co-defendant's
confession is virtually identical ... to that of a defendant, it may be deemed reliable'[as] an interlocking confession." Id. at 663 (quoting State v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416, 427(Wash. 1993) (en banc) (citation omitted)). The Washington Supreme Court reasoned
that the statements "interlocked" because Crawford and Sylvia were "equally unsure"
of the timeline of events and "equally unsure" how Crawford got the cut on his hand.
Id. at 664. The court concluded that "'neither [Crawford] nor Sylvia clearly stated thatLee had a weapon in hand from which [Crawford] was simply defending himself.And it is this omission by both that interlocks the statements and makes Sylvia's
statement reliable."' Id. (quoting State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-11, 2001 WL
850119, at *7 (Wash Ct. App. July 30, 2001) (Armstrong, C.J., dissenting)).
2005]
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari32 to determine
whether admitting Sylvia's statement at trial violated Crawford's rights under
the Confrontation Clause. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that
one of the failings of the Roberts test was its unpredictability, observing that
"[r]eliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept."33 As evi-
denced by the conflicting holdings of the lower courts in this case,
34 the Su-
preme Court noted that the outcome of the test "depends heavily on which
factors the judge considers and how much weight he accords each of them."
35
However, the Court found that the "unpardonable vice" of the Roberts
test was not its unpredictability but rather "its demonstrated capacity to admit
core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to
exclude." 36 Abrogating Ohio v. Roberts, the Court held that to meet the re-
quirements of the Confrontation Clause, testimonial hearsay evidence is ad-
missible only when the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.
37
32. Crawford v. Washington, 539 U.S. 914 (2003) (mem.).
33. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. The Court noted that "[t]he framework is so
unpredictable that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even core
confrontation violations." Id.
34. See supra notes 27, 30-31 and accompanying text.
35. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. As further evidence of the subjective nature of the
Roberts test, the Court observed that "[s]ome courts wind up attaching the same sig-
nificance to opposite facts." Id. See United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs.
Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 245 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding a statement more reliable because it
was "fleeting"), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401,
406-07 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (holding a statement more reliable because it was "de-
tailed"), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. See also Farrell, 34 P.3d at 407 (hold-
ing a statement more reliable because it was made "immediately after" the events at
issue); Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 305, 316 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (holding a state-
ment more reliable because two years had passed since the events at issue), abrogated
by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; Nowlin v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 367, 372 (Va. Ct.
App. 2003) (holding a statement more reliable because the witness was in custody and
charged with a crime, thus making the statement against her penal interest), abrogated
by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding a statement more reliable because the witness was not in custody and not a
suspect), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
36. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. The Court noted that despite its cautionary dicta
indicating it was "highly unlikely" that accomplice confessions attempting to shift
blame to a criminal defendant would be deemed reliable under the Roberts test, id. at
63-64 (citing Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999)), courts continue to admit
these statements, id. The Court cited a recent study finding that accomplice statements
were admitted by appellate courts in 25 out of 70 cases. Id. at 64 (citing Roger W.
Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 53
SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 105 (2003)).
37. Id. at 68. The Supreme Court acknowledges two possible exceptions to this
rule: (1) Dying Declarations (see infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text) and (2)
[Vol. 70
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The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him., 38 To determine the extent to which
the Framers intended "witnesses against" to include out-of-court statements,
we must examine the text in light of the historical backdrop against which the
amendment was adopted.
A. The Historical Backdrop of the Confrontation Clause
While the right to confront one's accusers is a concept dating back to
Roman times, 39 its roots in English common law probably originated in 1603
with Sir Walter Raleigh's trial for treason. 40 During Raleigh's trial, prior
statements made by Lord Cobham, Raleigh's alleged accomplice, were read
to the jury.41 Raleigh argued that in his original statement Cobham had lied to
save himsel f42 and demanded to confront his accuser "face to face. ''43 How-
ever, "the English court rejected his request as having no foundation in the
common law," 44 and Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to death.45 One of
the trial judges later acknowledged that "'the justice of England has never
been so degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Ra-
leigh."46
the Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Doctrine (see infra notes 163-73 and accompanying
text).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16 (1988) (quoting the biblical ac-
count of Roman Governor Festus' treatment of prisoners in Acts 25:16 where Paul
states: "It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the
accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to defend
himself against the charges.").
40. See Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient
and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481, 482
(1994).
41. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
42. Id.
43. Hermmann & Speer, supra note 40, at 481 (quoting Trial of Sir Walter Ra-
leigh, 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 15 (1603)).
44. Id. at 481-82.
45. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
46. Id. (quoting I DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 520 (1832)). As an under-
score to this injustice, it is now believed that Cobham sent a written statement to Ra-
leigh prior to trial which denied Raleigh's involvement in any plot to overthrow the
throne. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 n.10 (1970) (citing 1 JAMES F.
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326 (1883)). Contrary to
Cobham's initial statement, Raleigh believed if Cobham were called to testify, he
would instead testify in Raleigh's favor. Id. (citing 1 STEPHEN, supra, at 333-36).
20051
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In reaction to the injustice of Raleigh and similar abuses, English law
began recognizing the right of confrontation. 47 Courts began to strictly limit
the admission of testimonial evidence by witnesses unavailable to testify at
48 4trial. In King v. Paine,49 even when the witness died prior to trial, the King's
Bench refused to admit a prior statement made to a government official be-
cause the defendant did not have the opportunity for cross-examination.
5 0 By
1791, when the Sixth Amendment was ratified, the bright-line rule articulated
in Paine had become a settled rule at common law.5 1
B. The Supreme Court's Prior Interpretations
of the Confrontation Clause
In 1807, during the trial of Aaron Burr, the government attempted to in-
troduce the prior statements of Burr's alleged accomplice who was unavail-
able to testify.52 Chief Justice Marshal noted the futility of the Confrontation
Clause if "mere verbal declarations, made in his absence, may be evidence
against him."5 3 The Court held that prior statements not made in the presence
of the accused could not be admitted into evidence.5 4 However, subsequent
opinions show a migration away from this bright-line rule. In 1878, the Court
stated that the right of confrontation does not apply when the witness is dead
or out of the court's jurisdiction.5 5 The Court later retracted part of this hold-
47. See Green, 339 U.S. at 156-57 & n.10.
48. See Lord Morley's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769 (1666); see also MATTHEW
HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 164 (1713) and WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373 (1768) (both suggest-
ing that the quest for truth can only be satisfied when an accused is given the oppor-
tunity for cross-examination of witnesses against him).
49. 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (1696).
50. Id.
51. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46-47 (citing King v. Woodcock, I Leach 500, 502-
04, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789); King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562-63, 168 Eng.
Rep. 383, 383-84 (1791); cf. King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 459-61, 168 Eng. Rep.
330, 331-32 (1787); 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364, at 23 (2d ed. 1923)).
52. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 198. Chief Justice Marshall further stated,
If, for example, one of several men who had united in committing a mur-
der should have said, that he with others contemplated the fact which was
afterwards committed, I know of no case which would warrant the admis-
sion of this testimony upon the trial of a person who was not present when
the words were spoken.
Id. at 194-95.
55. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1878). The Court later clari-
fied its position by holding that mere negligence on the part of the adverse party
which prevents a witness from appearing in court is sufficient to allow the admissibil-
ity of a prior statement. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1990).
[Vol. 70
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ing by stating that the witness's absence from the court's jurisdiction alone
was not sufficient to admit the prior statement.5 6 But, in a subsequent deci-
sion, the Court conceded that the witness's absence from the court's jurisdic-
tion alone was sufficient when the witness had moved to Sweden.57
In Pointer v. Texas,58 the Court found that the right to "confront" a wit-
ness is not satisfied when the prior statement was made in the presence of the
defendant if the defendant was unrepresented and did not have the opportu-
nity for cross-examination.
59
In California v. Green,60 Justice Harlan wrestled with the meaning of
the Sixth Amendment right noting that "[t]he Confrontation Clause comes to
us on faded parchment. History seems to give us very little insight into the
intended scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.",61 The Court
examined the context in which the prior statement was made, and suggested
that a level of formality similar to that of trial may be required for its later
admissibility.
62
By the time of Ohio v. Roberts, the Court had been trying to divine the
Framers' intent for nearly two centuries. Recognizing the importance of the
Confrontation Clause,63 the Roberts Court noted that, despite a general bar
against the admission of hearsay evidence, 64 the common law has become
"riddled with exceptions." 65 In its examination of these common law devel-
56. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
57. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
58. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
59. Id. at 407-08.
60. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
61. Id. at 173-74 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan noted that:
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is not one that we may
assume the Framers understood as the embodiment of settled usage at
common law .... Such scant evidence as can be culled from the usual
sources suggests that the Framers understood "confrontation" to be some-
thing less than a right to exclude hearsay, and the common-law signifi-
cance of the term is so ambiguous as not to warrant the assumption that
the Framers were announcing a principle whose meaning was so well un-
derstood that this Court should be constrained to accept those dicta in the
common law that equated confrontation with cross-examination.
Id. at 174-75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 165. See also State v. Hall, 508 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
63. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Court noted that the inability to adequately confront
witnesses "'calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process."' 1d.(quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (internal quotations
omitted)).
64. See generally FED. R. EVID. 802.
65. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 253-324 (John
W. Strong ed. 4th ed. 1992) for a list of common law exceptions which varies drasti-
cally by jurisdiction. See also FED R. EVID. 803, 804(b) for more than twenty codified
2005]
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opments, the Court concluded that many of the hearsay exceptions were
predicated on ensuring the reliability of the evidence.66 The Court held that
when the prosecution is unable to produce the witness for trial after making a




A. The Majority Opinion
In Crawford v. Washington,69 the Supreme Court reexamined the consti-
tutionality of its twenty-three-year-old Roberts decision. 70 Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia71 noted that the Confrontation Clause is ambiguous
on its face because the phrase "witnesses against" could be interpreted to
include a variety of possible meanings. 72 A narrow interpretation could limit
its scope to include only those witnesses who testify at trial, or the text could
be interpreted broadly to include any statement offered at trial.73 After a
lengthy examination of the common law right of confrontation prior to the
exceptions. The Court compared the variety of available exceptions to "'an old-
fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists, futur-
ists and surrealists."' Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62 (quoting Edmund M. Morgan & John
M. Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REv. 909,
921 (1937)).
66. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. The Court noted that the "'hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values."' Id. (quoting
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1971)).
67. Id. However, the Court noted that sometimes no effort is required because
"[t]he law does not require the doing of a futile act. Thus, if no possibility of procur-
ing the witness exists (as, for example, the witness' intervening death), 'good faith'
demands nothing of the prosecution." Id. at 74.
68. Id. at 66. The Court found that "adequate 'indicia of reliability"' exist when
the evidence is admissible under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or otherwise
bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id.
69. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
70. Id. at 42. More than a decade earlier, Justice Thomas (joined by Justice
Scalia) foreshadowed this reexamination noting that "our Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence has evolved in a manner that is perhaps inconsistent with the text and his-
tory of the Clause itself." White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment).
71. Justice Scalia was joined in his majority opinion by Justices Stevens, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsberg, and Breyer. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Jus-
tice O'Connor, filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Crawford, 541
U.S. at 37.
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adoption of the Sixth Amendment, 74 the Court concluded that the primary
focus of the Confrontation Clause was the "use of ex parte examinations as
evidence against the accused., 75 The Court concluded that the constitutionally
limited use of ex parte examinations applied to "'witnesses' against the ac-
cused," or in other words, to "those who 'bear testimony. ",,76
The Court then turned to a variety of possible definitions of "testimo-
nial" evidence to be included in the limitations of the Sixth Amendment.77
Failing to agree on a specific definition, the Court reasoned that some deter-
minations can be made "[r]egardless of the precise articulation., 78 To illus-
trate, the Court noted that ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing would
be considered "testimonial" under any definition,79 but that business records
and statements in furtherance of a conspiracy would not be included. s
The Court also reasoned that statements taken by police officers during
"interrogations" would also be considered "testimonial." 8 1 However, the
Court again stopped short of defining its terminology, noting only that it
"use[d] the term 'interrogation' in its colloquial, rather than any technical
74. Id. at 43-50. See supra Part III.A.
75. Id. at 50. The Court noted that there is no direct correlation between the
scope of the Confrontation Clause and the use of hearsay testimony. Id. at 50-51.
First, some hearsay statements are not included in the scope of the Confrontation
Clause. Id. at 51. For example, "[a]n off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable
evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears
little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted." Id. Sec-
ond, the Court acknowledged the possibility that the scope of the Confrontation
Clause may not be "solely concerned with testimonial hearsay." Id. at 53.
76. Id. at 51 (quoting 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
77. Id. at 51-52. In exploring the meaning of the term "testimonial," the Court
cited the following four definitions: (1) "'A solemn declaration or affirmation made
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."' Id. (quoting I WEBSTER, supra
note 76). (2) .'[E'x Parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is,
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant
was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially."' Id. (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 23,
Crawford (No. 02-9401)). (3) "'[E]xtrajudicial statements... contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confes-
sions."' Id. at 52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)). (4) "'[S]tatements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial."' Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. at 3, Crawford (No. 02-940 1)).
78. Id. at 52.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 56. See infra notes 144-45 for further discussion of the intended scope
of these exclusions.
81. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
20051
9
Jordan: Jordan: Examining the Repercussions of Crawford:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
legal, sense."8 2 The Court acknowledged that "U]ust as various definitions of
'testimonial' exist, one can imagine various definitions of 'interrogation,' and
we need not select among them in this case.' 8 3 The Court concluded that be-
cause Sylvia's statement was "knowingly given in response to structured
police questioning," it would be considered testimonial under "any conceiv-
able definition."8 4 Having found Sylvia's statement to "fall squarely" within
the scope of testimonial evidence limited by the Confrontation Clause, the
Court turned its attention to interpreting the specific limitations that must be
constitutionally imposed.8 5
After a review of the historical record, the Court reasoned that the cen-
tral purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of evi-
dence.8 6 According to the Court, the Sixth Amendment addresses this concern
by prescribing a specific procedural method for accomplishing this goal.
7
The Court concluded that the right of cross-examination is not merely a sug-
gested method for ensuring the reliability of testimonial evidence, but rather it
is an absolute constitutional requirement for its admissibility.88
The Court criticized its prior decision in Roberts by observing that al-
lowing a judicial determination of reliability is substituting the "constitution-
ally prescribed method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one."
9 It
reasoned that the Roberts test is simultaneously too broad and too narrow.
90 It
is too broad because the test applies regardless of whether ex parte testimony
is involved and often excludes evidence that is unrelated to the concerns of
the Confrontation Clause.9' It is also too narrow because it allows for the
admission of ex parte testimony based on the mere determination of reliabil-
ity, a result which is constitutionally prohibited by the Court's new interpreta-
tion of the Sixth Amendment.
92
To correct the simultaneous overbreadth and underbreadth of its previ-
ous test,93 the Court abrogated its decision in Ohio v. Roberts, holding that to
meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, testimonial hearsay evi-
dence is admissible only when the witness is unavailable and the defendant
82. Id. at 53 n.4.
83. Id.
84. Id..
85. Id. at 53.
86. Id. at 61.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 62. The Court analogized that "[d]ispensing with confrontation because
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defen-
dant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes." Id.
90. Id. at 60.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 61.
[Vol. 70
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had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 94 Applying this rule to the
facts of the case, the Court concluded that because Crawford did not have the
opportunity to cross-examine Sylvia, the admission of her testimonial state-
ments at trial violated Crawford's Sixth Amendment right to confront wit-
nesses against him.95 The judgment of the Washington Supreme Court was
reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.9 6
B. The Concurrence
In a separate opinion concurring only in the judgment, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, 97 reading the majority opinion to have entirely overruled Ohio v.
Roberts, disagreed with the majority's decision.98 The Chief Justice noted that
any decision to overrule a case "decided nearly a quarter of a century ago"
must be approached with caution and weighed against the principles of stare
decisis.9 9 In such a case, a ruling consistent with established precedent "'is
the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial deci-
sions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process."
00
Rehnquist argued that stare decisis should apply here because the major-
ity's "distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, contrary
to its claim, is no better rooted in history" than the Roberts test.'0 ' Rehnquist
noted that "[s]tarting with Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation as a Circuit
Justice in 1807, 16 years after the ratification of the Sixth Amendment'0 2
94. Id. at 68. The Supreme Court acknowledges two possible exceptions to this
rule: (1) Dying Declarations (see supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text) and (2)
the Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Doctrine (see supra notes 163-73 and accompanying
text).
95. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. The Court expressed no opinion about whether
invoking spousal privilege constituted a waiver of Crawford's confrontation rights. Id.
at 42 n.l. The Washington Court of Appeals rejected the State's waiver argument
reasoning that "[florcing the defendant to choose between the marital privilege and
confronting his spouse presents an untenable Hobson's choice." State v. Crawford, 54
P.3d 656, 660 (Wash. 2002) (en banc), rev'd, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The state did not
subsequently challenge this conclusion. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42 n. 1.
96. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69.
97. Justice O'Connor joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion.
98. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
99. Id. at 75. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
100. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
827 (1991)).
101. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
102. Id. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 187, 193 (CC Va. 1807) (No. 14,694)).
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continuing with our cases in the late 19th century 10 3 and through today'04 we
have never drawn a distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial
statements."'
0 5
Rehnquist further argued that the ambiguity of the majority's new rule
also weighs in favor of maintaining the Roberts test.10 6 The Chief Justice
opined that the majority decision "casts a mantle of uncertainty over future
criminal trials in both federal and state courts."' 0 7 The majority deliberately
omitted a comprehensive definition of "testimonial," on which its new test
relies.108 The Chief Justice chastised the Court for leaving "the thousands of
federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors ... in the
dark."' 1 9 Because the rules of evidence are applied every day in courts
throughout the country, Rehnquist felt that practitioners needed clearer guid-
ance regarding the specific types of "testimony" covered by this new rule.10
Absent clearer guidance, the Chief Justice gave the majority credit for hold-
ing any court's mistaken application of the rule to a mere harmless-error
standard.'11
103. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 243-44 (1885) and Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 54-57 (1899)).
104. Id. at 72 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
352-53 (1992)).
105. Id. According to Rehnquist, a distinction that appears to emerge from the
historical record is one based not on the classification of the statement as "testimo-
nial," but rather a distinction that relates to whether or not the declarant was under
oath. Id. at 69-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach
500, 503, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (K.B.1789) and King v. Braisier, 1 Leach 199, 200,
168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B. 1779)).
106. Id. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
107. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
108. Id. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
109. Id. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
110. Id. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
111. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Rehnquist referred to an implicit recogni-
tion of the harmless error standard in a majority footnote which observed that "[t]he
State also has not challenged the Court of Appeals' conclusion (not reached by the
State Supreme Court) that the confrontation violation, if it occurred, was not harm-
less. We express no opinion on [this] matter[]." Id. at 42 n. 1. Subsequent courts have
followed this implicit recognition, holding erroneous admissions that violate Craw-
ford to a harmless error standard. See United States v. Rashid, 383 F.3d 769, 776 (8th
Cir. 2004) (While the out-of-court statements made by a co-defendant to an FBI agent
during the course of an interrogation were "testimonial" and thus inadmissible under
Crawford, the conviction was affirmed because "the other evidence of [the defen-
dant's] guilt was overwhelming."); United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637, 643-45 (8th
Cir. 2004) (The court declined to determine whether defendant's confession to his
mother who allegedly later became an agent of the government was "testimonial"
under Crawford, concluding that the confession "merely corroborated the large
amount of evidence presented against Lee at trial. Any error in the admission of these
statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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Rather than overturning Ohio v. Roberts, Rehnquist suggested that the
Washington Supreme Court's decision to support the admission of Sylvia's
statement in this case could be reversed on other grounds. 112
V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington can be simul-
taneously viewed as both a victory for criminal defendants 113 and an addi-
tional obstacle for prosecutors. 114 Hailed as the Court's "most significant
evidence decision in a number of years,"' 15 Crawford has significant reper-
cussions for criminal practitioners.16
Prior to Crawford, the admission of prior statements by an unavailable
witness under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" automatically satisfied the
"adequate 'indicia of reliability"' requirement to overcome the defendant's
112. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice
would instead rely on the Court's holding in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-24
(1990), which states that an out-of-court statement is not admissible solely because its
truthfulness was corroborated by other evidence at trial. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring). Rehnquist reasoned that because the Supreme Court of Washington gave deci-
sive weight to the corroborative evidence that Sylvia's statement "interlocked" with
Crawford's testimony, it erred in applying the law and its judgment could be reversed
without reexamining the constitutionality of the Roberts test. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring).
113. One commentator notes that "Crawford is a very positive development, re-
storing to its central position one of the basic protections of the common law system
of criminal justice." Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Deci-
sion Restores the Confrontation Clause Protection, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Summer 2004,
at 4, 5 (2004).
114. According to the American Prosecutor's Research Institute, "the United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the 6th amendment confrontation clause in such
a manner as to undermine the ability of prosecutors to admit ... hearsay statements
when the [witness] is unavailable for testimony." Victor I. Vieth, Keeping the Balance
True: Admitting Child Hearsay in the Wake of Crawford v. Washington, UPDATE(Nat'l Ctr. for Prosecution of Child Abuse, Alexandria, Va.), Nov. 12, 2004, at 12,
available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/KeepingBalanceWake.pdf.
115. Treadwell, supra note 4, at 1219.
116. In anticipation of trial, Crawford "requires that all counsel keep a close eye
on future interpretations of the opinion. To do otherwise is to put at risk future prose-
cutions or to suffer the consequences of ineffective assistance of counsel." Major
Robert William Best, 2003 Developments in the Sixth Amendment: Black Cats on
Strolls, ARMY LAW., July 2004, at 55, 64. Practitioners may also face instances where
evidence was originally admitted under the Roberts standard, but is later subjected to
post-Crawford appeal. See Perrotta, supra note 4, at 1 (identifying strategies for ap-
peal). "While prosecutors suggest they will be able to deflect most appeals with a
'harmless error' defense, it is clear they will have to spend hours vetting cases they
thought were all but closed." Id.
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right of confrontation. 1 7 Crawford essentially parses the hearsay and
confrontation requirements into two separate inquires. 118 After determining
the admissibility under a hearsay exception, a court must then determine
whether a confrontation violation exists.
The analysis that follows is intended as a practitioner's guide to under-
standing the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington. First, this
analysis begins by identifying Missouri's previously-settled hearsay excep-
tions which will likely suffer the greatest impact under the new interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause. Second, this analysis provides a framework for
determining whether a given statement violates a defendant's right of con-
frontation under the new standard.
A. Crawford's Impact on Previously-settled
Missouri Hearsay Exceptions
Statements previously admitted under the following hearsay exceptions
will now have difficulty surviving a constitutional challenge:
Statements of Child Abuse Victims-The Court's holding in Crawford
seriously calls into question the validity of Missouri's statutory provision
allowing the admissibility of prior statements of child abuse victims that are
absent from trial." 19 The determination of admissibility will hinge on whether
these statements are considered "testimonial" under Crawford.120 Crawford
makes it clear that statements made in response to police interrogations that
were admissible prior to Crawford'21 will now be considered "testimonial"
and inadmissible. 122 Depending upon which definition of "testimonial" is
117. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
118. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-61.
119. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.075 (2000) which provides that a statement made
by a child under the age of fourteen relating to an offense under Mo. REv. STAT. chs.
565 (offenses against the person), 566 (sexual offenses), or 568 (offenses against the
family) is admissible upon a judicial determination of reliability when the child is
either determined to be unavailable or when "significant emotional or psychological
trauma... would result from testifying."
120. The Court specifically questioned the validity of its holding in White v. Illi-
nois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), where the out-of-court statements by a child abuse victim
to an investigating police officer were admitted over a hearsay objection. Crawford,
541 U.S. at 58 n.8.
121. See State v. Murray, 838 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (admitting state-
ments of five-year-old sodomy victim made during police interrogation), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Redman, 916 S.W.2d 787 (Mo. 1996) (en banc); State v.
Gill, 806 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (admitting statement of four-year-old
victim of sexual abuse during police questioning); State v. Phelps, 816 S.W.2d 227,
229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (admitting child statement in response to questioning by
juvenile officer).
122. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53.
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eventually adopted, statements made to the victim's physician, 123 nurse,124
therapist,125 parent,126 or other relative 127 that were previously admitted under
the Roberts test may also no longer be admissible. 28 Even when the state-
ment is determined to be testimonial, an argument could be made in favor of
its admissibility under the forfeiture doctrine. 1
29
Dying declarations-In Missouri, statements made just before death by
a now-deceased victim of criminal homicide concerning the cause of death
have long been an exception to the hearsay rule.' 30 The Crawford Court noted
that dying declarations which are non-testimonial are not covered by its new
rule. 13 1 The Court saved for another day the decision of exactly what rule
applies to dying declarations that are testimonial. 132 The court acknowledged
the argument that testimonial dying declarations may be permissible because
the hearsay exception for dying declarations is the only criminal hearsay ex-
ception recognized at common law. 33 However, the Court was careful to note
that it "need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorpo-
rates an exception for testimonial dying declarations. If this exception must
be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis."' 34
Statements Against Interest-Missouri courts have historically recog-
nized a hearsay exception for statements against interest. A statement against
interest is a statement made against the pecuniary, proprietary, or penal inter-
est of the declarant when the circumstances make any motive to falsify im-
probable. 135 Because the Supreme Court in Crawford held that the judicial
123. See State v. Naucke, 829 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
124. See State v. Mackey, 822 S.W.2d 933 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
125. See State v. Jankiewicz, 831 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
126. See State v. Whittle, 813 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
127. See State v. Jefferson, 818 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Gillam, 916 S.W.2d 787 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
128. In State v. Courtney, 682 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), a Minnesota
court found that a videotaped interview of a child witness by a child protection
worker was considered "testimonial" under Crawford and violated the defendant's
right of confrontation. Id. at 196-97. The court reversed the conviction stating that the
error in admitting the statement was not harmless because the evidence was critical to
the case. Id.
129. See infra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
130. Cummings v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 269 S.W.2d 111, 119-21 (Mo. 1954);
see also State v. Strawther, 116 S.W.2d 133, 137 (Mo. 1938).




135. See State v. Grant, 560 S.W.2d 39, 42-43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). See also State
v. Blankenship, 830 S.W.2d 1, 6-8 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (further expanding the ex-
ception to statements against penal interests in criminal cases when the declarant's
confession exculpating the criminal defendant is corroborated by additional evi-
dence); Osborne v. Purdome, 250 S.W.2d 159, 163 (Mo. 1952) (en banc) (originally
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determination of reliability was an impermissible substitute for the defen-
dant's right of confrontation,' 36 testimonial statements admitted under this
exception will undoubtedly fail to survive a constitutional challenge.
Residual Exception-The residual exception allows for the admissibility
of declarations not included within other hearsay exceptions upon a finding of
reliability and trustworthiness. 37 As with statements against interest, a judi-
cial determination of reliability will no longer be sufficient to admit prior
testimonial statements by an unavailable witness under the residual hearsay
exception. 1
38
B. Determining if a Prior Statement Violates the Confrontation Clause
To determine whether the admissibility of a prior statement violates the
Confrontation Clause, a Missouri practitioner must engage in the following
six-step process:
[1] Is the statement being used to establish the truth of the matter as-
serted? If not, the Crawford majority acknowledged that no violation oc-
curs. 13 9 Only if the prior statement is being used to establish the truth of the
matter asserted does the Crawford analysis continue.
[2] Will the declarant be testifying at trial? If so, the Crawford majority
confirmed that "the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the
use of' prior statements."' 40 Only if the declarant will not be testifying at trial
does the Crawford analysis continue.
4
'
[3] Is the statement "testimonial"? Although the Supreme Court failed
to provide a comprehensive definition of what statements would be consid-
ered "testimonial" under the Crawford test, it recognized that statements at a
preliminary hearing or trial are testimonial, 42 as are statements made in re-
applying the exception only to statements against pecuniary or proprietary interests);
Sutter v. Easterly, 189 S.W.2d 284, 289-90 (Mo. 1945) (expanding the exception in
civil cases to include statements against penal interests).
136. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62.
137. See Moore v. Dir. of Revenue, 811 S.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
138. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62.
139. Id. at 59 n.9.
140. Id. (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)).
141. In a recent post-Crawford decision, the Eight Circuit distinguished between a
criminal trial and a subsequent parole revocation hearing and concluded that Craw-
ford did not apply to the admission of evidence in the later instance. United States v.
Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 844 n.4 (8th Cir. 2004). The court noted that "a parole revoca-
tion hearing should not, for this purpose, be equated with a criminal trial. In other
words, the constitutional standard applicable in this type of post-conviction revocation
hearing will sometimes permit the admission of evidence that would otherwise be
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution." Id. at 844 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 489 (1972)).
142. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
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sponse to structured police questioning.143 However, the Court cited business
records' 44 and statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy14 as examples
of non-testimonial statements. Beyond these limited examples, the Court sur-
veyed four possible definitions of "testimonial. 14 6 These definitions appear
to be mostly concerned with the presence of sufficient formality in the decla-
ration.
The Eighth Circuit recently indicated a preference for the adoption of
the most limited definition of "testimonial" allowed by the Supreme Court.' 47
The Eighth Circuit noted that "by its terms, Crawford's holding applies 'to
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former
trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modem practices with closest
kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed."" 148
Although acknowledging "this definition," the Eighth Circuit concluded that
Crawford was not to be retroactively applied. 149
143. Id.
144. Id. at 56. While the Court did not define what constituted "business records"
for the purposes of this exclusion, it is unlikely that the Court intended all records
kept in the course of business to be categorically excluded from any finalized defini-
tion of "testimonial." For example, while an autopsy report specifically prepared in
preparation for trial could technically be considered a "business record," it also re-
sembles the very type of ex parte testimony that the Confrontation Clause is intended
to protect. However, a recent trial court decision in Alabama failed to conduct a fact
specific analysis, but instead elected to categorically admit an autopsy report prepared
by a medical examiner who was unavailable to testify at trial after classifying the
report as a "business record." Smith v. State, No. CR-02-1218, 2004 WL 921748, at
*8 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2004).
145. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. Unlike the Court's example of "business records"
as non-testimonial hearsay, its recognition of statements by a co-conspirator as non-
testimonial is more likely intended as a categorical exclusion due to this exception's
basis in agency theory. See United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579, 590-91 (8th Cir.
2002) (holding that the Confrontation Clause did not guarantee the defendant the right
to cross-examine a speaker whose statements were imputed to the defendant as adop-
tive admissions of a party opponent.). Post-Crawford decisions have consistently
recognized that statements by co-conspirators are categorically non-testimonial. See
United States v. Reyes, 362 F.3d 536, 540-41 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Lee,
374 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 2004).
146. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52; see also supra note 77.
147. Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2004)
148. Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68). In quoting the Supreme Court, the
Eighth Circuit omitted the preceding text of Crawford which states, "We leave for
another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.' What-
ever else the term covers it applies at a minimum .... Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68
(emphasis added).
149. Evans, 371 F.3d at 444-45. In support of its conclusion that the Crawford
standard should only be prospectively applied, the Eight Circuit noted that "the Craw-
ford Court did not suggest that this doctrine would apply retroactively and the doc-
trine itself does not appear to fall within either of the two narrow exceptions to
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If the statement is not testimonial, the Crawford Court left undefined the
appropriate standard to apply and instead enumerated three possibilities.1
5 0
The Court first noted that "it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to
afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law."' 5' Alterna-
tively, the Court did not foreclose application of the Roberts test to non-
testimonial statements.' 52 Finally, the Court noted that perhaps non-
testimonial statements should be "exempted ... from Confrontation Clause
scrutiny altogether."'
' 53
Only if the statement is "testimonial" does the Crawford analysis con-
tinue.
[4] Is the declarant "unavailable" to testify? Prior testimonial state-
ments by a witness absent from trial are admissible only when the court de-
termines that "the witness is unavailable as a practical proposition."',
54 Mis-
souri courts have found declarants "unavailable" for trial when the declarant
is dead,155 insane, 156 physically' 57 or emotionally' 58 disabled, suffering from
Teague v. Lane's non-retroactivity doctrine." Id. (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989)). The Eighth Circuit indicated that these two exceptions include "(1) new rules
that place 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of
the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,"' and "(2) 'watershed rules of crimi-
nal procedure' that increase the accuracy of the judicial process." Id. (quoting Teague,
489 U.S. at 311). However, the Eighth Circuit's decision did not reference another
Teague exception which provides for the retroactive application of new rules "if a
failure to adopt them Will result in an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will
be convicted and if the procedure at issue implicates the fundamental fairness of the
trial." United States v. Sanchez-Cervantez, 282 F.3d 664, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2002). The
application of this exception is supported by the Crawford majority's references to the
Confrontation Clause as a "bedrock procedural guarantee" of a fair trial, Crawford,
541 U.S. at 42, and the only constitutionally prescribed method for ensuring the reli-
ability of testimony, id. at 61. Alternatively, retroactivity could be advocated by argu-
ing that the Crawford Court did not actually articulate a "new rule" at all, but merely
recognized a requirement that was incorporated into the Constitution in 1791. The
Crawford Court noted that the roots of its holding date "back to Roman times." Id. at
43. In addition, "the common law in 1791 conditioned admissibility of an absent
witness's examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine. The
Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those limitations." Id. at 54.
150. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Although states may not be constrained by the Confrontation Clause
when adopting admission standards for non-testimonial evidence, presumably they
would still be constrained by other constitutional limitations such as the Due Process
Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
154. Sutter v. Easterly, 189 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Mo. 1945).
155. See State v. Fleming, 451 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Mo. 1970) (per curiam).
156. See State v. Pierson, 85 S.W.2d 48, 52-54 (Mo. 1935) (per curiam).
157. See State v. Williams, 554 S.W.2d 524, 531-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
158. See In re S. J., 849 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
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memory loss, 159 asserting the privilege against self-incrimination,' 60 or after
the exercise of due diligence to procure the declarant's presence.' 61 Only if
the declarant is "unavailable" to testify does the Crawford analysis continue.
[5] Did the defendant have the prior opportunity for cross-examination?
If so, the Confrontation Clause is not violated.' 62 Only if the defendant did
not have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant does the Crawford
analysis continue.
[6] Did the defendant forfeit the right to confront the witness against
him? The Crawford majority affirmed the validity of the forfeiture by wrong-
doing doctrine which essentially extinguishes the right of confrontation on
equitable grounds.' 63 In 1934 dicta, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
right of confrontation "may be lost by consent or at times even by miscon-
duct."' 64 However, the doctrine has only recently gained mainstream applica-
tion. 16 While many jurisdictions, 166 including the Eighth Circuit,167 have
159. See Orr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 494 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Mo. 1973)
(en banc).
160. See State v. Holt, 592 S.W.2d 759, 766 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
161. See State v. Sanders, 903 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
162. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). The Crawford holding
does not abrogate its prior decisions which define the circumstances under which a
sufficient "opportunity" for cross examination has been provided. See Mancusi v.
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-16 (1972); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-68
(1970); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-08 (1965).
163. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing was
articulated in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which stated:
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should
be confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by
[the accused's] own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if compe-
tent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept
away. The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the
legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privi-
lege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he volun-
tarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, there-
fore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied ii some
lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights
have been violated.
Id. at 158. For a discussion of the historical background of this doctrine and related
issues, see Paul T. Markland, Comment, The Admission of Hearsay Evidence Where
Defendant Misconduct Causes the Unavailability ofa Prosecution Witness, 43 AM. U.
L. REv. 995 (1994).
164. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934), overruled in part by
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
165. In 1997, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine was codified as an exception
to the hearsay evidence rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence. FRE 804(b)(6) now
allows the admission of "[a] statement offered against a party that has engaged or
acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of
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recently recognized the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, Missouri has not
applied the doctrine in nearly eight decades.
168
Although the forfeiture doctrine has historically been applied to in-
stances where the defendant's act of wrongdoing occurred subsequent to the
the declarant as a witness." FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). The Federal Rules of Evidence
committee notes state that
Rule 804(b)(6) has been added to provide that a party forfeits the right to
object on hearsay grounds to the admission of a declarant's prior state-
ment when the party's deliberate wrongdoing or acquiescence therein pro-
cured the unavailability of the declarant as a witness. This recognizes the
need for a prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent behavior "which strikes
at the heart of the system of justice itself."
FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee note (quoting United States v. Mastrangelo,
693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir.1982)).
166. In United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982), the only wit-
ness to a drug conspiracy was killed while en route to the courthouse. Id. at 271.
While the trial court admitted the deceased witness's prior grand jury testimony under
the residual hearsay exception, the Second Circuit remanded the case for an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine the defendant's role in the death of the witness. Id. at 273.
The Second Circuit noted that
[i]f the District Court finds that [the defendant] was in fact involved in the
death of [the witness] through knowledge, complicity, planning or in any
other way, it must hold his objections to the use of [the witness's] testi-
mony waived. Bare knowledge of a plot to kill [the witness] and a failure
to give warning to appropriate authorities is sufficient to constitute a
waiver.
Id. at 273-74. See also United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir.1992); United
States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 789 (2d Cir. 1984); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d
1193, 1199 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir.
1979).
167. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976). The court found that
a witness to a drug transaction had "refused to testify because of threats directed
against him by [the defendant]." Id. at 1353. The court recognized that "[t]he Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation is, by its language and historical underpinnings, a
personal right of the accused and is intended for his benefit." Id. at 1357 (citing
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975)). "As such, this right, like other
federally guaranteed constitutional rights, can be waived by the accused." Id. at 1357-
58 (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, (1966)). The court further noted that a
valid waiver requires a voluntary "'relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege."' Id. at 1358 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). The
court admitted the witness's prior grand jury testimony after concluding that the de-
fendant's threats against the witness constituted a voluntary waiver of his right of
confrontation. Id. at 1360.
168. The last Missouri case recognizing the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine
was decided in 1926. State v. Brown, 285 S.W. 995 (Mo. 1926). In this case, the de-
fendant was tried for selling "moonshine" and the court admitted the witness's prior
testimony after finding that the witness "was absent and out of the jurisdiction of the
court by the procurement and connivance of the defendant." Id. at 995.
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criminal act for which the defendant was charged, 169 the Crawford decision
has led at least one commentator to advocate the expansion of this doctrine to
include instances where the witness was prevented from testifying due to the
very act for which the defendant is on trial. 170 The Supreme Court of Kansas
recently agreed with this expansive application allowing the statements of a
gunshot victim to be admitted against his assailant. 17 1 If Missouri courts also
decide to endorse the expansive application of the forfeiture doctrine, the
statutory allowance of hearsay testimony of child abuse victims may survive
a constitutional challenge. 72 The courts could reach this conclusion by find-
ing that the "significant emotional or psychological trauma which would re-
sult from testifying" was caused by the defendant's wrongful act. 173
If the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing does not apply, the admission of
an unavailable witness's prior testimonial hearsay statement clearly violates
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation under the Crawford
test.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although this Note has identified potential repercussions of the Supreme
Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington and provided a framework for
analyzing the new standard, Missouri practitioners still face significant uncer-
tainty. Some hearsay evidence previously admissible under a "firmly rooted
hearsay exception" or because it possessed "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness"'' 74 will no longer be allowed under the Court's new stan-
169. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
170. See Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and
Hearsay, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 252 (2002) (noting that "[a]t first glance,
this application of the forfeiture principle might seem to be a bizarre instance of boot-
strapping. But it is not .... For purposes of deciding whether the forfeiture principle
applied, the judge would determine whether the accused had committed misconduct
rendering the witness unable to testify.... [T]he judge would not have to explain her
decision to the jurors and so would not need to inform them that she had made a de-
termination as to whether the accused had committed misconduct. The jury would
decide guilt or innocence of the crime.").
171. State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004). In response to questioning by the
first police officer to arrive at the scene, the victim stated, "Meeks shot me." Id. at
792. The victim died as a result of the injury and was unavailable to testify at trial. Id.
The court recognized that the victim's statement made in response to police question-
ing was arguably "testimonial" under Crawford. Id. at 793. However, the court con-
cluded that it "need not determine whether the response was testimonial or not ...
because we hold that Meeks forfeited his right to confrontation by killing the wit-
ness." Id. at 793-94.
172. See supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
173. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.075.1(c) (2000).
174. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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dard. 175 However, because the Court failed to define its key terms, practitio-
ners await future judicial guidance to help solidify the application of the
Court's new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.
JON W. JORDAN
175. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
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